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Abstract 
The goal of this project is to analyse if, using economic analysis tools, it’s feasible to consider an 
incentive scheme for students and universities in which universities would discount an amount from the 
tuition in exchange for strong academic results, and the idea is to analyse if said universities could 
benefit from something like this. Even though it is set in a completely theoretical framework, it would 
be interesting to see further research done based on this idea after having collected some data 
regarding tuition programmes and building a regression model to try and estimate something similar 
to what in this model is referred to as α and β.  
When looking into it in a real world, it would probably have more application in students who are 
postgrads, rather than graduate students, since that’s the academic research that it is thought could 
benefit a university. Regardless, publications are just used as an idea since it’s what public universities 
use nowadays to measure “output” when evaluating professors and candidates.  
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0. PRELUDE 
This project has been written whilst in the middle of a “what should I do next year” crisis. 
Having been a university student for quite a while, it was kind of a big issue I had to deal 
with: should I apply for a master’s and keep living off of my parents as a student? Should 
I take a break and get a job? Should I travel the world? The biggest issue I had (and still 
have) with staying as a student is money. Obviously, earning higher education brings 
future wealth and more happiness than one could ever hope for (or so I’ve been told), but 
as of now what it means is asking for student loans and living precariously or having a 
part-time job (in my case, teaching English) and having some money but also living 
precariously because, in that case, you don’t get to sleep.  
So there I was, happily awake in the middle of the night, trying to decide the topic on my 
project and what to do next year… magically, it all came together. “Hey, what if I find a 
formal way to convince universities to pay an average student like myself to go and study 
there? I could promise them I’ll try my best. But how will they verify it, you ask? Well, 
they can’t, but I can tell them exactly what I should be offered to accept and work hard.” 
And since information economics has always been one of my interests, it was kind of 
obvious what I needed to do.  
 
Special thanks 
I would like to thank my project supervisor, Amedeo Piolatto, for guiding me through the 
steps of writing this Bachelor Project, and for his quick response to all of my requests, 
and for attempting to teach me how to use LaTex: even though I did not succeed, I will 
for sure learn how to use it in the near future, when time constraint isn’t an issue.  
I would also like to thank my father, Dionís Boixader, for helping me plot the graphs that 
appear in this Bachelor Project.  
Marcel 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation and goals 
The reason for which this topic has been chosen is a mix of genuine academic interest 
and the personal situation that aligned with the realization of this project.  
In an increasingly competitive world, education plays a crucial part in human 
development and general welfare improvement. Given the increase in universities and the 
common assumption that young people should study as much as possible and for as long 
as they can afford, it is certainly an area that deserves analysis and dedication from the 
academic community.  
Although traditionally university has been mostly available to those born in higher 
income households, this is now less true in most developed countries. However, studying 
does not usually pay for itself at the moment of doing so: one studies with the goal of 
earning future wealth, but it comes with the sacrifice of present income. That is the reason 
for which a study such as the one exposed in this bachelor thesis makes sense: Could 
subsidizing university studies be a way of benefitting both parties involved? Do 
asymmetries of information change the answer to that first question? 
1.2. References and previous work 
The first literature that was read were papers written by some of the pioneers in the field 
of economics of information, such as Stigler (1961), Akerlof (1970), Arnott and Stiglitz 
(1990), Holmstrom (1982), and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Once the idea for the 
project was decided, some digging through jstor.org1 and sciencedirect.com2 showed that 
vast research in this field already exists. According to Greenaway and Haynes (2003) the 
number of universities in the UK tripled between 1960 and 2000, while the number of 
students went from around 400,000 to 2,000,000. Besides that, universities followed a 
privatization trend: do these factors affect universities’ behaviour? Do they have access 
to better quality students? 
In a similar line of empirical studies, but in the USA in this specific case, Dynarski (2002) 
analyses the effect price discrimination in university tuition has on welfare and university 
efficiency. It is also mentioned that universities assign scholarships, although those are 
                                                 
1 http://jstor.org 
2 http://sciencedirect.com 
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based not only on academic merit but also on athletic ability (college sport is a big 
industry in the USA) and others. However, American universities are mostly private, so 
one could argue that they’re run in a more “profit-oriented” way, which is the reason for 
which sports scholarships and others are such a big deal.  
In a more theoretical framework, and more in the likes of this project, Rothschild and 
White (1995) set a basic problem with a model that describes the students’ as the 
universities input and the human capital it generates as an output. In their paper, a case of 
symmetric and complete information is analysed, suggesting further research that takes 
informational asymmetries, which are a reality, into account. This was followed up by 
Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008), who wonder why would universities set admission 
requirements and tuition fees at the same time since that seems counterintuitive.  
An ideal model, that was well out of the authors reach due to its complexity and the time 
constriction to which this project is submitted, would have been derived from the open 
suggestion made by Rothschild and White (1995), Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008) that 
would take into account family income and skill premium such as was done in De Fraja 
(2009). It would be of the author’s interest, as well, to follow up with an empirical study 
to try and estimate university utility functions and what students actually consider when 
deciding to go to university, and how that affects their utility and expected welfare.  
1.3. Methodology 
The functions chosen to represent the specific cases reflect what I believe would define a 
real-world situation in general terms: a situation in which the student is willing to give up 
more in order to attend university than the university is willing to give up in order to have 
that student.  
This can be interpreted as the student having more willingness to take risks than the 
university is. For that, the university’s utility function is set as concave to define risk 
aversion and the student’s utility function is set as a plane to show risk neutrality.  
Even though the idea of this project is to define a general case, it’s hard to give answers 
without setting specific utility functions once the optimal values for y and e have been 
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decided in general terms. Therefore, 
throughout the project, all the cases 
are solved assuming that the 
university’s preferences are defined 
by a sigmoid function3, and a 
student’s preferences are defined by 
a plane.  
Sigmoid functions were chosen 
because of their properties4: 
- Real-valued 
- Monotonous 
- Differentiable 
However, as it will be seen and commented upon in the conclusions, the preferred 
payments to students will depend largely on the university’s preferences and what they 
give most importance to: either they give more importance to the publications from the 
students, yielding results that would favor hiring “good students” and induce them to 
produce high effort, or more importance to the monetary variables, in which case they 
will likely prefer bad students who exert low effort and, therefore, represent a higher 
monetary income. 
1.4. Analysed cases 
The problem can be analysed from two different perspectives: 
- Complete information 
- Incomplete information 
The first one, complete information, analyses what happens when all the players are fully 
informed on the other players’ preferences and utility.  
The second one, incomplete information, analyses what happens when that is not the case. 
This has been looked into for two types of information incompletion: moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Detailed analysis and solutions have been given for both these cases, 
                                                 
3 As seen in Figure 1. 
4 See (Wikipedia, 2017). 
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and then there is the last section which tries to set the maximization problem a university 
would face when under both adverse selection and moral hazard.  
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2. SETTING THE BASE PROBLEM 
2.1. Main problem and notation 
The main problem that needs to be solved is the following: how will a university decide 
how much to offer a student on which they have no information? For that, a general utility 
function for the university and a general utility function for a student have been set. The 
university’s goal is to maximize its utility, and the student’s goal is to obtain a minimum 
amount of utility from accepting the contract. Since we’re solving the general case first, 
the utility function for the university and the student don’t really go into specifics about 
the quality of the student and its work 
(which will be evaluated as the number of 
publications). The notation used 
throughout the project is shown in Table 
2-1. Bear in mind that h, l, g, and b are 
used as subindexes for U, p, x, w, y, e, and 
q. For example, eh will refer to high effort. 
The three variables on which the functions 
depend can be grouped into two 
independent variables: a monetary 
variable (x and w which will be substituted 
by y=w-x) which indicates the effect of a 
variation in monetary income on the utility 
function, and a non-monetary variable (e 
or p), which indicates the effect of a variation in effort on the utility function.  
2.2. Functions to be maximized 
The following step is to define the university’s utility function B and the student’s utility 
function U, which are set as:  
 1 2( , , ) ( ) ( )B p x w f p f x w      (2.2.1) 
 1 2( , , ) ( ) ( )U x e w v w x v e     (2.2.2) 
Symbol Meaning 
B University’s expected utility 
U Student’s expected utility 
u0 Student’s reservation utility 
α, β Constants 
p Number of publications 
x Tuition 
w Amount university pays the student 
y w-x 
e Effort exerted by student 
h High 
l Low 
g Good 
b Bad 
q Probability 
Table 2-1 
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The functions 1 2 1 2,  ,   and f f v v  are assumed to be of a general character, and they are only 
required to be differentiable and monotonically increasing functions. The parameters α 
and β are positive numerical constants. The utility functions B and U will be determined 
as soon as 1 2 1 2,  ,   and f f v v are chosen from a specific family of functions and the 
parameters take specific values. 
Note that an optimal choice of the specific family of functions and the parameters are not 
within the goals of this work, and the assumption made is that they’re given a priori. The 
parameters have an easy interpretation since they express the relative importance each 
university gives to the value of publications and to the value of money, meaning they 
define each university’s preferences.  Different universities have different α and β, but it 
is set as a condition that under all circumstances 1   .  
Now, the university’s utility function B and the student’s utility function U can be written 
as functions of y, which is the difference between the payment received (w) and the tuition 
(x).  
 1 2( , ) ( ) ( )B p y f p f y     (2.2.3) 
 1 2( , ) ( ) ( )U y e v y v e    (2.2.4) 
Note that (2.2.3) is increasing with respect to p and decreasing with respect to y, while 
(2.2.4) is increasing with respect to y and decreasing with respect to e. This is due to the 
properties of the functions defined as 1 2 1 2,  ,   and f f v v .  
The student will never accept a contract unless his expected utility is at least as high as 
his reservation utility u0. Therefore, the university’s maximization problem is restricted 
to an inequality in which the student’s expected utility needs to be equal to (or higher 
than) the reservation utility.  
 1 2,max ( ) ( )p y f p f y    (2.2.5) 
s.t.  
 01 2( ) ( )v y v e u    (2.2.6) 
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Although this may be easily solved, it lacks a practical interpretation, since the university 
may set only one of the two variables, y, but has no control of any kind over the remaining 
one, e. In order to address this issue, it will be assumed that the university has two possible 
outcomes, noted as ph and pl, depending on the number of publications, ph being a high 
number of publications and pl being a low number of publications. There is a probability 
distribution assigned to each of these outcomes 
depending on the effort exerted by the student, and 
by its type. These probabilities are shown in Table 
2-2 and Table 2-3.  
The interpretation of these two tables could be read 
as a good student has a probability hq  of generating 
hp  when his effort is he  . 
It’s worth noting that e eh l , p > ph l  and 
(q ,q )>(0.5,0.5)h l .  
These probabilities need to be considered to calculate the expected utility for both the 
university (which acts as the principal) and the student (who is the agent).  
As mentioned in the introduction, a specific utility function has been set for the university 
and the same thing has been done for students. Since both functions are separable on y 
and p (for the university) and on y and e (for the student), the assigned values for each of 
the functions mentioned above are the following: 
 1( ) arctan( )f p p   (2.2.7) 
 2 ( ) arctan( )f y y   (2.2.8) 
 1( )v y y   (2.2.9) 
 2
         if student is good
( )    where k>1
          if student is bad
e
v e
ke
 

  (2.2.10) 
Given these values, the university’s utility function will now be represented by (2.2.11) 
and the student’s utility will be represented by (2.2.12) when the student is good and 
(2.2.13) when the student is bad. See Figure 2 for a visual representation of the 
university’s preferences given specific values for parameters.  
 ph pl 
eh qh 1-qh 
el 1-ql ql 
Table 2-2. Probability of each outcome for 
a good student 
 ph pl 
eh 1-qh qh 
el 0 1 
Table 2-3. Probability of each outcome for 
a bad student 
14 
 
 arctan( ) arctan( )B p y     (2.2.11) 
 U y e    (2.2.12) 
 U y ke    (2.2.13) 
 
Figure 2. Utility function for the university given parameters alpha=0.33 and betha=0.67 
Throughout the project, graphs have been 
plotted in order to set an example of how this 
could be solved graphically. To do this, values 
have been assigned to all the q, h, y and e, and 
these values are shown in Table 2-4.  
0
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-3
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-2
2
-3
-1
1
3
0
-1
1
-0.5
0.5
X
Y
Z
(α, β) (0.33, 0.67) 
(ph, pl) (1.5, 0.5) 
(eh, el) (0.75, 0.25) 
(qh, ql) (0.75, 0.55) 
u0 -0.5 
Table 2-4. Values assigned in order to draw 
functions and preference maps 
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3. SOLVING UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION 
3.1. What is complete information? 
Complete information is described as “an 
economic situation in which knowledge about 
other market participants or players is available 
to all participants”5 (Wikipedia, 2018). 
In the problem stated above, complete 
information would imply that the university 
knows exactly which is the student’s type (good 
or bad) and the effort exerted by the student is 
verifiable: that means that the university knows 
the likelihood of each outcome and it can verify 
if the student exerted high effort or low effort. 
Therefore, the restriction for the university is 
binding (university knows the minimum amount 
that should be offered and would still be accepted) 
and is subject to the student’s utility being equal to its reservation utility.  
3.2. Setting the maximization problem 
In this case, the university will maximize its expected utility taking into account the 
probabilities assigned in Table 2-2 and in Table 2-3 depending on the type of student. 
That means that there are now 4 possibilities that the university needs to compare:  
- Good student and high effort 
- Good student and low effort 
- Bad student and high effort 
- Bad student and low effort 
The university will offer a contract to whichever of these four maximizes the objective 
function B.  
                                                 
5 See Figure 3. 
"In economics and game theory, 
complete information is a term 
used to describe an economic 
situation or game in which 
knowledge about other market 
participants or players is available 
to all participants. The utility 
functions, payoffs, strategies and 
"types" of players are thus 
common knowledge." 
Source: Complete information - 
https://en.wikipedia.org 
Figure 3. Complete Information definition 
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3.2.1. Good student and high effort 
 1 2 1 2,max  [ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]h l h h h h l ly y
q f p f y q f p f y         (3.2.1) 
s.t. 
 01 2 1 2[ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]h h h h l hq v y v e q v y v e u       (3.2.2) 
3.2.2. Good student and low effort 
 1 2 1 2,max  [ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]h l l l l l h hy y
q f p f y q f p f y         (3.2.3) 
s.t. 
 01 2 1 2[ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]l l l l h lq v y v e q v y v e u       (3.2.4) 
3.2.3. Bad student and high effort 
 1 2 1 2,max  (1 )[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]h l h h h h l ly y
q f p f y q f p f y         (3.2.5) 
s.t.  
 01 2 1 2(1 )[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]h h h h l hq v y v e q v y v e u       (3.2.6) 
3.2.4. Bad student and low effort6 
 1 2,max  ( ) ( )h l l ly y
f p f y    (3.2.7) 
s.t. 
 01 2( ) ( )l lv y v e u    (3.2.8) 
3.3. Solving the problem for each case under complete information 
To solve each of these cases we will be using the first order condition approach with a 
Lagrangian. However, since there is complete information and the restrictions are binding 
in all 4 cases, the optimal v(y) will be the same for yh and yl because of what is known as 
the efficiency condition. Nevertheless, we will prove that in all four cases by setting the 
Lagrangian and showing that yh=yl=y when under complete information.  
                                                 
6 Note that in Table 2-3 the probability of a high outcome with a bad student and low effort is set to 0. 
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3.3.1. Good student and high effort 
The Lagrangian will be as shown in (3.3.1). 
  
1 2 1 2
0
1 2 1 2
[ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]
[ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]
h h h h l l
h h h h l h
L q f p f y q f p f y
q v y v e q v y v e u
   

     
     
  (3.3.1) 
The first order conditions (FOC) are: 
 1 2' ( ) ' ( )h h h h
h
L q v y q f y
y
   

  (3.3.2) 
 1 2(1 ) ' ( ) (1 ) ' ( )h l h l
l
L q v y q f y
y
     

  (3.3.3) 
 01 2 1 2[ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]h h h h l h
L q v y v e q v y v e u

        (3.3.4) 
When solving (3.3.2) and (3.3.3) we find (3.3.5) and (3.3.6) for λ: 
 2
1
' ( )
' ( )
h
h
f y
v y
    (3.3.5) 
 2
1
' ( )
' ( )
l
l
f y
v y
    (3.3.6) 
Which means that yh=yl=y, provided that 
'
2
'
1
( )
( )
f y
v y
 is an injective function. 
Substituting yh and yl for y in Eq. (3.3.4), which is the original restriction, the 
optimal function of y that the university offers a good student in exchange for high 
effort is: 
 01 2( ) ( )hv y v e u    (3.3.7) 
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3.3.2. Good student and low effort 
The rest of the cases under complete information will be resolved in the same way 
and can be referred to in the Annex, but only the Lagrangian and final solution will 
be shown here.  
In this case: 
  
1 2 1 2
0
1 2 1 2
[ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]
[ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]
l l l l h h
l l l l h l
L q f p f y q f p f y
q v y v e q v y v e u
   

     
     
  (3.3.8) 
Which turns into: 
 01 2( ) ( )lv y v e u    (3.3.9) 
3.3.3. Bad student and high effort 
  
1 2 1 2
0
1 2 1 2
(1 )[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
(1 )[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
h h h h l l
h h h h l h
L q f p f y q f p f y
q v y v e q v y v e u
   

     
     
  (3.3.10) 
As expected, the general case gives the same solution as the one for a good student 
and high effort defined in (3.3.7). This will change when solutions for the specific 
functions are computed, but as of now:  
 01 2( ) ( )hv y v e u    (3.3.11) 
3.3.4. Bad student and low effort 
Taking the probabilities defined in Table 2-3: 
 01 2 1 2( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]l l l lL f p f y v y v e u         (3.3.12) 
The solution is the same as in (3.3.9): 
 01 2( ) ( )lv y v e u    (3.3.13) 
3.4. The university’s choice 
The university will choose which contract will offer and to whom it will do so. Since the 
solution has been found for a general case, it’s hard to know what is the optimal setting 
for the university. For that reason, the set of functions shown in section 2.2. will be 
introduced and the results can be computed from there.  
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Figure 4 University preferences map 
 
Figure 5 Student's utility function, which is the 
restriction 
In the figures shown, one can see the university’s preferences (Figure 4), the student’s 
utility map (Figure 5) and the optimal 
solution, given the values in Table 2-4, is 
shown graphically in Figure 6. The 
solution will be where the university’s 
indifference curves are tangent to the 
student’s utility for the student’s 
indifference curve in which U=u0. 
 
3.4.1. Good student and high 
effort 
Eq. (3.3.7) now turns into: 
 0hy e u    (3.4.1) 
Generating the university and expected utility of: 
 0arctan( ) (1 ) arctan( ) arctan( )h h h l hB q p q p e u         (3.4.2) 
3.4.2. Good student and low effort 
Eq. (3.3.9) now turns into: 
 0ly e u    (3.4.3) 
Generating the university an expected utility of: 
 0arctan( ) (1 ) arctan( ) arctan( )l l l h lB q p q p e u         (3.4.4) 
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3.4.3. Bad student and high effort 
Eq. (3.3.11) now turns into: 
 0hy ke u    (3.4.5) 
Generating the university an expected utility of: 
 0arctan( ) (1 ) arctan( ) arctan( )h l h h hB q p q p ke u         (3.4.6) 
3.4.4. Bad student and low effort 
Eq. (3.3.13) now turns into: 
 0ly ke u    (3.4.7) 
Generating the university an expected utility of: 
 0arctan( ) arctan( )l lB p ke u      (3.4.8) 
Different universities will find different optimal contracts depending on the relative value 
assigned to p and y, that is, depending on the values of α and β which, in all cases, add up 
to 1.  It can be seen, though, that the higher the value assigned to publications, the higher 
the utility derived from having a good student who exerts high effort, since in those cases 
the first part of the equation will be larger when the probability of a higher number of 
publications is larger than that of low publications, and a good student is more efficient 
than a bad student (meaning that a unit of effort from a good student has a lower impact 
on the student’s expected utility than it would on a bad student).  
In such a situation, the university only offers one type of contract depending on their 
expected utility derived from said contract, and it will only hire one type of student subject 
to a specific effort level. 
3.5. Specific example and comparison 
In order to compare results between different cases, a specific example has been 
calculated in each section. The values used for this example are always the same and are 
those given to draw the utility curves in Table 2-4, and k=3. Introducing said values into 
Eq. (3.4.1), Eq. (3.4.2), Eq. (3.4.3), Eq. (3.4.4), Eq. (3.4.5), Eq. (3.4.6), Eq. (3.4.7), and 
Eq. (3.4.8) the results are: 
 0.25ghy    (3.5.1) 
 6.72ghB    (3.5.2) 
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 0.25gly     (3.5.3) 
 22.58glB    (3.5.4) 
 1.75bhy    (3.5.5) 
 29.15bhB     (3.5.6) 
 0.25bly    (3.5.7) 
 0.63blB     (3.5.8) 
Where the first item in the subindices indicates the quality of the student and the second 
one indicates the effort level.  
In both cases (good student and bad student), a higher level of effort proves more 
expensive to the university and therefore less desirable for this specific case. However, 
given ygl is positive and the university’s expected utility is still positive, one could argue 
that it could still be beneficial to pay a good student for high effort. 
All in all, the university will offer a discount to the good student and ask for low effort: 
the student will still have to pay a certain amount of tuition (remember that y=w-x) but 
that’s what yields the highest expected utility for the university. 
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4. SOLVING UNDER MORAL HAZARD 
The rest of the cases that will be solved for this project are assuming that there is 
incomplete information and the goal is to analyse what happens to the players when 
asymmetries of information arise. This section focuses on Moral Hazard, a situation in 
which the university knows the type of student its dealing with but cannot verify the effort 
that said student will exert. 
4.1. What is moral hazard? 
Moral hazard arises when the principal cannot verify the agent’s behaviour once the agent 
is covered by an insurance policy or, in our case, when the agent has signed a contract. In 
the base problem we set in the second part of the project7 this would translate into the 
effort the student could exert, which can either be high or low, being non-verifiable by 
the university. Therefore, the university needs to find an optimal contract that incentivises 
the student to exert the desired level of effort and that maximizes the university’s expected 
utility.  
Bear in mind that, in this case, the university has information on the type of student but 
not on their effort. The probabilities of each outcome given each effort for each type of 
student stay the same as those shown in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3. 
4.2. Setting the maximization problem for each case 
As was done in the case with complete information8, the university needs to find four 
optimal contracts. However, in the absence of full information, the salaries for each 
contract will depend on the final outcome, and the goal is to induce the student into 
exerting the desired effort by using these differences in y.  
When working under the assumption of moral hazard, the objective function is subjected 
to two restrictions rather than just one. These restrictions are: 
- Participation Constraint (PC): the expected utility from the desired effort level 
needs to be at least as high as the student’s reservation utility.  
                                                 
7 See 2. SETTING THE BASE PROBLEM. 
8 See 3.2. Setting the maximization problem. 
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- Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC): the expected utility from the desired 
level of effort needs to be at least as high as the expected utility from the 
alternative level of effort.  
These restrictions tend to be binding: since the university knows the student’s utility in 
each case, it will set y as low as the student will accept whilst making sure that the 
university still maximizes the objective function.  
4.2.1. Good student when the university wants to induce high effort 
The following procedure will be used to set all four cases that the university needs 
to maximize. The objective function and the participation constraint will be the 
same as those used in (3.2.1) and (3.2.2), which are indicated as (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) 
in this specific case. The incentive compatibility constraint needs to be taken into 
account and will be added (4.2.3).  
 1 2 1 2,max  [ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]h l h h h h l ly y
q f p f y q f p f y         (4.2.1) 
s.t. 
 01 1 2( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )h h h l hq v y q v y u v e      (4.2.2) 
 
1 1 2
1 1 2
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
                      
      ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
h h h l h
h l h h l
q v y q v y v e
q v y q v y v e
  

  
  (4.2.3) 
4.2.2. Good student when the university wants to induce low effort 
The objective function (4.2.4) and participation constraint (4.2.5) are once again 
taken from the complete information case, and the incentive compatibility 
constraint needs to be added.  
 1 2 1 2,max  [ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]h l
l l
l l h hy y
q f p f y q f p f y         (4.2.4) 
s.t. 
 01 1 2( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
l l
l h lq v y q v y u v e      (4.2.5) 
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1 1 2
1 1 2
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
                         
        ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
l l l h l
h h h l h
q v y q v y v e
q v y q v y v e
  

  
  (4.2.6) 
4.2.3. Bad student when university wants to induce high effort 
 1 2 1 2,max  (1 )[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]h l
h h
h h l ly y
q f p f y q f p f y         (4.2.7) 
s.t. 
 01 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )h h h l e hq v y q v y u v e      (4.2.8) 
 1 1 2 1 2(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )h h h l h l lq v y q v y v e v y v e       (4.2.9) 
4.2.4. Bad student when the university wants to induce low effort 
 1 2,max  ( ) ( )h l l ly y
f p f y    (4.2.10) 
s.t. 
 01 2( ) ( )l lv y u v e    (4.2.11) 
 1 2 1 1 2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )l l h h h l hv y v e q v y q v y v e       (4.2.12) 
4.3. Solving the problem for each case under moral hazard 
At this point, we need to check if the restrictions are binding and show proof of it. If they 
are binding, there’s no need to solve using Lagrange’s method since there are two 
restrictions and two variables that need to be determined (yh and yl). Proof of binding 
restrictions will be provided for section 4.3.1 and for the other paragraphs in the annex. 
In every low effort case, it is widely spread and assumed that the optimal payment scheme 
will have the same payoff scheme as the complete information version since it is assumed 
that when the agent accepts the contract his instinct is to exert low effort since that is what 
brings the least amount of disutility.  
What that means is that if the principal tries to convince the agent to exert low effort, it’ll 
offer only one possible salary regardless of the outcome, which is the minimum salary 
the agent will accept and that was computed in the complete information case.  
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In this case, the graphical representation of the problem has been done in 4 figures, which 
show the objective function, the two restrictions, and the graphical solution. These are 
Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10. 
 
Figure 7 University's indifference curves 
 
Figure 8 Curves representing the participation 
constraint 
 
Figure 9 Curves representing the incentive compatibility 
constraint 
 
Figure 10 Solution 
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4.3.1. Good student when the university wants to induce high effort 
Solve what was done in section 4.2.1. by using a Lagrangian. Since it was discussed 
that these restrictions need to be binding9, given that the university knows the type 
of student and, therefore, the utility the student would receive from a given effort, 
the university can set a y that will bring the student just to the verge of accepting 
the contract without having to incur in any additional costs. Having two equations 
means that there’s no need for the Lagrangian since it can be solved as a system.  
With restrictions (4.2.2) and (4.2.3) both being binding, this can be solved as: 
 02 21
( ) (1 ) ( )( )
1
l h h l
h
h l
q v e q v ev y u
q q
  
 
  (4.3.1) 
 02 21
( ) (1 ) ( )( )
1
h l l h
l
h l
q v e q v ev y u
q q
  
 
  (4.3.2) 
As mentioned previously, utility derived from effort in a good student will be 
defined by Eq. (2.2.10). 
4.3.2. Good student when the university wants to induce low effort 
Since the university observes the type of student, it can always ensure the lowest 
level of effort by offering each type of student a payment that is equal to the 
reservation utility. Because the student will minimize their cost, that will lead to the 
lowest level of effort. Therefore, the payment will be set by that defined in equation 
(3.3.9).  
Even though one could make the effort to calculate the result of maximizing the 
problem shown in section 4.2.2, the complete information solution will guarantee 
that the student signs and have an even lower y.  
 01 2( ) ( )lv y v e u    (4.3.3) 
                                                 
9 Proof of binding restrictions can be found in the Annex. 
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4.3.3. Bad student when the university wants to induce high effort 
The monotonicity of the functions involved, and by the same procedure as in section 
4.3.1, allows to conclude that (4.2.8) and (4.2.9) are binding constraints. By the 
same procedure as in the good student, the results are: 
 02 21
( ) ( )( )
(1 )
h h l
h
h
v e q v ev y u
q
 

  (4.3.4) 
 01 2( ) ( )l lv y v e u    (4.3.5) 
4.3.4. Bad student when university wants to induce low effort 
Following the same reasoning as in good student and low effort10, the solution will 
be the same that was set when there was information completeness.  
 01 2( ) ( )lv y v e u    (4.3.6) 
4.4. The university’s choice 
The university will compute its expected utility from each of the previous cases and offer 
each type of student the contract that gives the highest expected utility. Just as what 
happened in section 3.4, the final decision by the university will depend on their utility 
function and the values given to α and β.  
4.4.1. Good student when the university wants to induce high effort 
Introducing (2.2.7), (2.2.8), (2.2.9), and (2.2.10) into  (4.3.1) and (4.3.2) : 
 0( 1)
1
l h h l
h
h l
q e q ey u
q q
  
 
  (4.4.1) 
 0( 1)
1
h l l h
l
h l
q e q ey u
q q
  
 
  (4.4.2) 
                                                 
10 See section 4.3.2. 
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Which, when introduced into the university’s expected utility function (4.2.1) has 
the following output: 
 
0
0
( 1)arctan( ) arctan
1
( 1)(1 ) arctan( ) arctan
1
l h h l
h h
h l
h l l h
h l
h l
q e q eB q p u
q q
q e q eq p u
q q
 
 
           
           
  (4.4.3) 
4.4.2. Good student when the university wants to induce low effort 
Since the y is going to be the same as in section 3.3.2, the B will also be the same.  
 0ly e u    (4.4.4) 
 0arctan( ) (1 ) arctan( ) arctan( )l l l h lB q p q p e u         (4.4.5) 
4.4.3. Bad student when the university wants to induce high effort 
Given equations (4.3.4) and (4.3.5), the solutions here would be: 
 0( )
1
h h l
h
h
k e q ey u
q
 

  (4.4.6) 
 0l ly ke u    (4.4.7) 
And the university’s expected utility from trying to induce high effort in a bad 
student: 
 
  0
0
( )(1 ) arctan arctan
1
arctan( ) arctan( )
h h l
h h
h
h l l
k e q eB q p u
q
q p ke u
 
 
          
    
  (4.4.8) 
4.4.4. Bad student when the university wants to induce low effort 
According to equation (4.3.6), the optimal y, in this case, would be: 
 0ly ke u    (4.4.9) 
And therefore, the university’s expected utility is: 
 0arctan( ) arctan( )l lB p ke u      (4.4.10) 
The university’s preferred option will greatly vary depending on the value of parameters 
α and β since that’s what defines their preferences. However, as discussed in the complete 
information case, it is easy to see that a university with a higher α will be more willing to 
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hire good students and try and induce high effort from them since that would yield a 
higher expected utility.  
4.5. Specific example and comparison 
The same will be done in this section as was done in section 3.5, but using equations 
(4.4.1), (4.4.2), (4.4.4), (4.4.5), (4.4.6), (4.4.7), (4.4.8), (4.4.9), and (4.4.10).  
4.5.1. Good student when the university wants to induce high effort 
The contract will include two salaries, one for a high number of publications and 
one for a low number of publications, which can be observed after having exerted 
the effort.  
 
0.67
1
h
l
y
y

 
  (4.5.1) 
And the university’s expected utility will be: 
 0.39B    (4.5.2) 
4.5.2. Good student when the university wants to induce low effort 
As discussed, there will only be one salary when the desired effort is low. In this 
case, it will be: 
 0.25y     (4.5.3) 
And the university’s expected utility will be: 
 22.58B    (4.5.4) 
4.5.3. Bad student when the university wants to induce high effort 
In this case, the contract will also include two salaries, which are: 
 
3.25
0.25
h
l
y
y


  (4.5.5) 
And the expected utility: 
 15.6B     (4.5.6) 
4.5.4. Bad student and the university wants to induce low effort 
In this case, there’s only one salary, and it yields: 
 0.25y    (4.5.7) 
 0.63B     (4.5.8) 
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These results indicate that, in this specific case, the university prefers to accept a good 
student but induce low effort from them, since that yields the highest expected utility. 
Given that it happens to be an option with low effort, there is no distortion at the top. It 
would be expected, however, that in a case in which the university prefers a student who 
exerts high effort (regardless of if it refers to a good student or a bad student), said student 
would receive an additional amount of utility derived from the information asymmetry in 
comparison to the equilibrium case.  
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5. SOLVING UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION 
In this section, the aforementioned problem will be set and attempted to be solved when 
the university does not know the type of student, that is when the university faces a 
situation of adverse selection.  
5.1. What is adverse selection? 
Adverse selection is a case of asymmetric information in which not all the parties 
involved in the contract have all of the information regarding the characteristics of the 
agent. In our specific case, the university knows that two types of students exist, and it 
also knows the probability distribution that describes their presence in nature, but it has 
no way of verifying the kind of student it’s about to offer the contract. Since the university 
cannot verify the type of student, the possibility that a student might lie in order to 
increase his expected utility must be considered when computing the optimal contract. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the effort is verifiable and will leave the 
more complex case (which is a situation with asymmetries arising from both adverse 
selection and moral hazard) for further on in the project11. 
5.2. Setting the problem  
As in the previous cases, there will be a contract for good students and a contract for bad 
students. The student can choose either to reject both of them or to accept one of them. 
The tricky part here is to induce the student into signing the “correct” contract, meaning 
the university needs to offer such contracts that a good student will always sign a contract 
designed for good students and vice versa.  
The university needs to maximize the objective function taking into account the salary 
that’ll pay and the effort that it’ll demand, and the two contracts offered will be those 
shown in Eq. (5.2.1) and Eq. (5.2.2): 
 ( , )g gy e   (5.2.1) 
 ( , )b by e   (5.2.2) 
                                                 
11 See 6.SOLVING UNDER MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION in page 36. 
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Where Eq. (5.2.1) indicates the contract that, optimally, a good student would sign and 
Eq. (5.2.2) indicates the contract a bad student would sign.  
It is important to analyse if the students have incentives to lie in order to gain utility (for 
example, good students might rather pretend to be bad students if the decrease in effort 
disutility is larger than the decrease in salary utility). Since the university now chooses 
the effort for each contract, and to simplify calculations, we will set 
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) and ( ) ( )h g l bf p f e f p f e   and introduce it to the objective function.  
The university also knows that the probability of any given student to be of type good is 
q, and the probability of the student to be bad is 1-q. 
There are now four restrictions when maximizing the objective function, and the 
maximization problem is the following: 
 1 2 1 2( , ),( , )max [ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]g g b b g g b by e y e
q f e f y q f e f y         (5.2.3) 
s.t. 
 01 2( ) ( )
g
g gv y v e u    (5.2.4) 
 01 2( ) ( )
b
b bv y v e u    (5.2.5) 
 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
g g
g g b bv y v e v y v e     (5.2.6) 
 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
b b
b b g gv y v e v y v e     (5.2.7) 
Where: 
- Eq. (5.2.4) is the participation constraint for the good student 
- Eq. (5.2.5) is the participation constraint for the bad student 
- Eq. (5.2.6) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the good student 
- Eq. (5.2.7) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the bad student 
And where 2 ( )
b
gv e  is the disutility that a bad student receives from exerting the effort 
expected from a good student. That is, the super index indicates the type of utility function 
given Eq. (2.2.10), and the sub-index indicates the effort level that the student is exerting.  
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5.3. Solving the problem under adverse selection 
To try and find the result, we’ll use the specific functions 1 2( ) and ( )v y v e , but not 
1 2( ) or ( )f e f y . This FOC approach looks simple enough to solve, but since the derivatives 
of arctan functions take the form 2
arctan( ) 1
1
x
x x




 , to solve it you need to go through 
fourth-degree polynomial equations, which are difficult and painful to solve. The solution 
to this problem is found by using Lagrange multipliers on the binding restrictions in order 
to maximize the university’s utility. Re-writing the maximization problem: 
 
1 2( , ),( , )
1 2
max [ ( ) ( )]
       (1 )[ ( ) ( )]
g g b b
g gy e y e
b b
q f e f y
q f e f y
 
 
 
  
  (5.3.1) 
s.t. 
 0g gy e u    (5.3.2) 
 0b by ke u    (5.3.3) 
 g g b by e y e     (5.3.4) 
 b b g gy ke y ke     (5.3.5) 
It’s easy to see that, in order for these restrictions to be all satisfied, not all of them can 
be binding. Given that ,  ,  and 1g b g by y e e k   : 
 0g g b b b by e y e y ke u        (5.3.6) 
Which implies that the participation constraint of the good student Eq. (5.3.2) is not 
binding ( 0g gy e u  ), but the participation constraint of the bad student Eq. (5.3.3) and 
the incentive compatibility constraint of the good student Eq. (5.3.4) can be. Regarding 
the ICC of the bad student Eq. (5.3.5), one needs to check if it’s satisfied once the results 
have been computed. 
The Lagrangian will look like this: 
 
   
     
1 2
1 2
0
1
g g
b b
b b g g b b
L q f e f y
q f e f y
y ke u y e y e
 
 
 
    
     
           
  (5.3.7) 
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And it needs to be maximized with respect to ,  ,  ,  and g b g be e y y . The FOC are the 
following: 
 '1 ( )g
g
L q f e
e
   

  (5.3.8) 
 '1(1 ) ( )b
b
L q f e k
e
      

  (5.3.9) 
 '2 ( )g
g
L q f y
y
    

  (5.3.10) 
 '2(1 ) ( )b
b
L q f y
y
       

  (5.3.11) 
Unfortunately, solving this means going through fourth-degree polynomial equations and 
this is long and tedious to solve, added to the fact that I lack the tools to do so. However, 
relations between variables and functions were established and could be used in specific 
cases in which q, ,  and    were known, and they could be solved if the effort were pre-
set in order to answer the question “In an adverse selection situation, which would be the 
optimal y for each level of effort and type of student?”. Doing this approximation is 
inefficient. So, after renaming the values ' ' ' '1 1 2 2( ),  ( ),  ( ),  ( )g b g bf e f e f y f y  as as , , ,g b g bE E Y Y  
respectively (for visual purposes exclusively) the following were found: 
 g gE Y    (5.3.12) 
 (1 ) (1 )b g b gq E qE k q Y k qY          (5.3.13) 
 0 0b by ke u     (5.3.14) 
 0g g b by e y e      (5.3.15) 
5.4. Specific example and comparison 
Given 1 2 and f f , deriving and solving has proven difficult. To solve the Lagrangian, 
what’s been done is enter the 6 equations derived from the Lagrangian in a Wolfram-
Alpha widget12.  The values entered were those used for the other specific examples13 but 
                                                 
12 http://www.wolframalpha.com/widgets/view.jsp?id=a9536b3eddefb39312a81eeeb828835f 
13 See Table 2-4. 
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leaving the effort as a variable (because 
in this case it is) and assuming that 
q=0.5, which means that the likelihood 
of the student being good is the same as 
the student being bad. The output is 
shown in Table 5-1. 
As seen in the output, there are two 
solutions to the problem. These are likely 
two relative maximums of the function 
within the set constraints, without being able to tell for sure. Bear in mind that λ and µ 
are Lagrange multipliers and, therefore, they are not relevant to the solution that concerns 
us.  
Since 2 2( ) ( )b gv e v e  for any given value of e, it is reasonable to assume that the 
university will ask for higher effort to good students and lower effort to bad students: 
doing so is less costly to the university and has a higher output.  
The expected utility from offering contracts is maximized when said contracts are 
( 8.68,  6.05)g gy e   and ( 3.69,  1.06)b by e    . However, given that the value for 
effort is negative, we can consider that the contract offered for the bad student is such that 
only good students will decide to sign a contract and will choose their type. The expected 
utility for the university calculated from the objective function  and with the obtained 
values is the following: 
 2.72B    (5.4.1) 
So it could be said that only the good student will accept the contract and the bad student 
will just have to pay tuition and exert whichever effort they prefer, but the tuition charged 
will have to compensate the discount (offered) to good students if the university wants 
positive expected utility.  
Since it was mentioned that only the participation constraint of the bad student and the 
incentive compatibility constraint of the good student were binding, and there was formal 
proof that the participation constraint of the good student is satisfied, it needs to be 
checked if the incentive compatibility constraint of the bad student is satisfied. So, 
introducing the values in equation Eq. (5.3.5) one can find: 
 Solution 1 Solution 2 
eg -10.92 6.05 
eb 2.58 -1.06 
yg -15.59 8.68 
yb 7.26 -3.69 
λ 0.007 0.02 
µ 0.0013 0.004 
Table 5-1. Output when entered in wolfram alpha 
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 ( 3.69) 3(1.06) (8.68) 3(6.05) 0.51 9.47          (5.4.2) 
It is satisfied. 
In this case, there is distortion at the top since the good student’s expected utility is higher 
than it was in equilibrium, and there is what’s known as informational rent, which is the 
difference between the university’s expected utility under symmetrical information and 
in adverse selection: that is a loss of efficiency caused by uncertainty. The university, in 
this case, faces a corner solution in which the bad student doesn’t want to engage in the 
proposed contract, or if paying tuition and exerting whichever effort it wants can be 
considered engaging, then doing that: bear in mind that the solution with negative effort 
satisfies the constraints, which means that if negative effort existed, it would be feasible. 
However, in a real setting negative effort is hard to imagine other than the bad student 
actively bothering the correct development of activity.  
It could also be considered “how much does the bad student have to pay in exchange for 
eb=0. In that case, the university would set the effort of the bad student to 0 and compute 
payments and effort for the good student.  
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6. SOLVING UNDER MORAL HAZARD AND 
ADVERSE SELECTION 
After having found the maximization problem to which universities are submitted under 
complete information, moral hazard, and adverse selection, it seems only natural to try 
and set the problem when universities face both moral hazard and adverse selection. 
However, given the time constraint and the complexity of result interpretation, there has 
been no formal attempt to actually solve this case for the specific defined functions, 
leaving it to future research in case someone ever considered it worth their time.  
In order to set this problem, there are different concepts that have appeared throughout 
the project that need to be taken into account. Until 
now, three different probabilities have appeared, 
those being ,  ,  and h lq q q .  We face the situation in 
which the university cannot verify the effort exerted 
by the student (such as those cases studied in 
section 0) and also can’t verify the type of student 
(see cases in section 5). 
Regarding the university’s expected utility, the university has to choose which amount of 
effort it will attempt to induce and then would use q to assign the likelihood of a good 
student exerting high effort and a bad student exerting high effort. It would do the same 
to calculate the expected utility derived from inducing low effort on either type of student.  
6.1. University prefers high effort 
See Eq. (4.2.1) and Eq. (4.2.7) to find the expected utility when the university has no way 
of verifying the effort or the type of student but wants to induce high effort. Take those 
and the new maximization problem is: 
 
 
 
1 2 1 2
, , ,
1 2 1 2
max [ ( ) ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]
(1 ) (1 )[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
g g b b
h lh l
g g
l h h l l l
y y y y
b b
h h h h l l
q q f p f y q f p f y
q q f p f y q f p f y
   
   
    
     
  (6.1.1) 
And the restrictions will be: 
 01 1 2( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
g g g
h h h l hq v y q v y u v e      (6.1.2) 
 01 1 2(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
b b b
h h h l hq v y q v y u v e      (6.1.3) 
q= Probability that the student of 
unknown type is good 
qh= Probability of an outcome when 
the student exerts high effort 
ql= Probability of an outcome when a 
student exerts low effort 
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 1 1 2
1 1 2
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
g g g
h h h l h
g g g
l l l h l
q v y q v y v e
q v y q v y v e
   
   
  (6.1.4) 
 1 1 2 1 2(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
b b b b b
h h h l h l lq v y q v y v e v y v e       (6.1.5) 
And to these four, there should be two additional restrictions that would prevent the 
student from lying about his type: 
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
g g g g
h h h h l h
b g b g
h h hb h l lb
q v y v e q v y v e
q v y v e q v y v e
          
          
  (6.1.6) 
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 lg
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
b b b b
h h h h l h
g b g b
h h hg h l
q v y v e q v y v e
q v y v e q v y v e
          
          
  (6.1.7) 
6.2. University wants low effort 
We would use the same procedure as we did for the case in which the university wants 
high effort but would change the utility functions and restrictions accordingly.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The project started with the idea of answering two sequential questions: 
- Could an incentive program in which a university discounts tuition (and even 
pays) for students who excel academically? 
- Would this still happen if the university lacks information regarding the student’s 
ability and interest? 
In a very simplified model, both questions have been answered in a theoretical framework 
in which it was assumed that it was both known what universities prefer and what students 
want. Even though it is a huge assumption, it was needed in order to set a reference. 
Given the utility functions, both students and universities can benefit from such a 
program. It’s proven beneficial for the university to have a certain type of student at a 
discounted tuition if that student produces certain results. Of course, the impact these 
results have on expected utility depend on the university’s preferences, and the parameters 
used when estimating them have a big impact on the outcome.  
What has been observed is that there is informational rent when situations of 
asymmetrical information are introduced into the analysis, since there is a difference 
between the amount that would be paid in symmetrical information (which is the 
benchmark situation, the equilibrium) and the optimal amounts found under moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  
This seems to be the case in Moral Hazard when the optimal situation includes high effort 
on either type of student since the premium paid for good results needs to be larger than 
it would under complete information, while the payment for low results is the same as the 
unique payment when information completeness exists.   
On the other hand, under adverse selection, where a general solution was not found 
(relations between variables were found, but not the solution), the specific calculated case 
needs to be taken into account and compared to the other cases with the same α and β. In 
this case, the contract designed to attract good students pays substantially more than the 
previous ones, although it also requires a larger amount of effort. In the case of the bad 
student, it yields results with negative effort and a negative payment, which basically 
means that the student will have to pay tuition but there won’t be much of an effort 
requirement. It could also be interpreted as the bad student deciding not to engage in the 
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contract and would result in the university having only good students accept the proposed 
contract. 
Since in economics the idea is to interpret the theoretical results in a world that is real, 
one could interpret that in that case the bad student will have to decide upon going to 
university based on other elements which are likely to be in their utility function: bear in 
mind that the negative value of y means that the student pays tuition, and since that is 
within the participation constraint of the bad student it does not mean that said student 
doesn’t want to go to university. However, the negative effort could be interpreted as a 0 
and therefore the student’s y would probably have to change a bit in order to still 
accommodate their participation constraint.  
Since scholarships and subsidies to university are a reality, it would be of interest to 
follow up this project with a regression model that attempts an estimation of a university’s 
utility function. It could also be of interest to compare the utility of a private university 
to that of a public university: public universities are thought of as public entities and have 
the goal of improving overall welfare while private universities are usually run with a 
financial goal in mind (although it’s not usually the only goal these universities have). 
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9. ANNEX 
9.1. Proof that there’s only one v(y) under complete information 
For the high effort case when the student is bad: 
 ' '2 1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
h h
h h
h
L q f y q v y
y
  

       (9.1.1) 
 ' '2 1( ) ( )
h h
l l
l
L q f y q v y
y
  

     (9.1.2) 
Which means: 
 
'
2
'
1
( )
( )
h
h
f y
v y
    (9.1.3) 
 
'
2
'
1
( )
( )
l
l
f y
v y
    (9.1.4) 
Provided that 
'
2
'
1
( )
( )
f y
v y
 is injective, then h ly y .  
9.2. Proof of binding restrictions under Moral Hazard 
For formal proof that restrictions are binding, Eq. (4.2.1) may be re-written as: 
 2 2,max   ( ) (1 ) ( )h l
h h
h ly y
q f y q f y c       (9.2.1) 
where k is a constant. Such function is: 
o Strictly decreasing in both hy  and ly  (since 2f  is a strictly increasing 
function, 0hq    and (1 ) 0hq   ). 
o Continuous 
On the other hand, the Eq. (4.2.2) may be re-written as 
 1 1( ) (1 ) ( ) ' 0
h h
h lq v y q v y c      (9.2.2) 
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Which is strictly increasing in both variables ,h ly y  . 
Suppose that a maximum of Eq. (9.2.1) is reached on a point 0 0( , )h ly y  such that Eq. 
(9.2.2) 0 0( , ) 0h ly y  . In that case, the continuity of Eq. (9.2.2) guarantees that Eq. 
(9.2.2) 1 1( , ) 0h ly y  for any 
1 1( , )h ly y  which is close enough to 
0 0( , )h ly y  . By choosing 
1 1 1 0 1 0( , ) s.t.  and h l h h l ly y y y y y   we will have that 
1 1 0 0( , ) ( , )h l h lB y y B y y  , showing 
that 0 0( , )h ly y cannot be a maximum. And by keeping ly  constant and using the same 
reasoning, we can prove that Eq. (4.2.3) is also binding.  
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